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BACKGROUND
Having your cake?
Almost a year after the referendum, Brexit negotiations finally got under way in June 2017, after the UK had notified
the European Union (EU) of its intention to leave under Article 50 of the EU Treaty on 29 March. Article 50 specifies a
fixed negotiation period of two years after notification, which can only be extended by unanimity among the EU27.
But despite the ticking clock, progress has been slow. While the EU27 quickly agreed on its guidelines and a clear
negotiating position (reputed to have been waved through in minutes), with a strong mandate for Chief Negotiator
Michel Barnier, the UK's position has been uncertain and in flux. 
The UK's initial position seemed to indicate a 'clean' (or hard) withdrawal from the EU, widely interpreted as an exit
from the Single Market and the Customs Union, with full control over immigration and no role for EU law or the
European Court of Justice (ECJ). But at the same time, the debate in the UK emphasised retaining the benefits of the
Single Market, albeit without the obligations. This approach was epitomised by a quote from the UK's Foreign
Secretary Boris Johnson as "having your cake and eating it too".
Reality bites
From an EU perspective, this was always an unlikely, and undesirable, proposition. The EU noted from the start that
being in the Single Market or having access to its benefits comes with obligations. These include financial obligations,
a role for the ECJ and free movement of people, all of which are hard to swallow for the current UK government.
The EU has also made it clear that negotiations about its long-term relationship with the UK could only start after the
exit arrangements have been agreed in principle; this so-called sequencing being non-negotiable. In any case, the
initial negotiations for an exit deal only aim to outline the future framework for EU-UK cooperation, rather than
defining this relationship in detail.
To agree on a withdrawal agreement implies finding a solution for (i) keeping the Northern Ireland border open, a
tricky proposition if Northern Ireland ends up outside the Customs Union, (ii) meeting the UK's financial obligations,
a hotly disputed topic between the two sides, and (iii) how the citizens' rights of EU citizens living in the UK can be
guaranteed post Brexit. The European Council is now waiting for a signal from Michel Barnier that sufficient progress
has been made before negotiations move onto the long-term trade relationship, but the date is now drifting as the
talks are not advancing.
It has also become increasingly clear that it will be necessary to agree to some form of transition, as it will prove
impossible to reach conclusions on the future relationship between the EU and UK in such a short timescale, i.e.
before March 2019. Some on the UK side have stipulated that such a transition could be a continuation of
negotiations, a lengthy implementation period to make a gradual exit or even an indefinite state in which the UK
would potentially stay in the EU in anything but name. None of these options are on the table. For the EU27, transition
simply means a continuation of all current arrangements for a limited period, but without the political rights members
enjoy. This is difficult to accept for Brexiteers in the UK, including the more than 40 Eurosceptic Conservative MPs that
have outright rejected such a transition in a letter to the Government written in early September.
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Presuming the withdrawal agreement can be agreed upon, there are now basically two scenarios for the long-term
relationship between the UK and EU: either a variant of the current Norway deal (in essence, membership without
voting rights), which has the advantage of broadly being off-the-shelf, or of the Canada deal; a negotiated trade deal,
economically inferior to full Single Market membership and hard to negotiate as it would require item-by-item decision-
making on maintaining or disentangling EU-UK economic relations, with the individual national interests of the EU27
taking centre stage. Independent of the potential outcome, the UK government's basic dilemma has not changed: the
better economically a scenario is, the less politically acceptable it is. In fact, it is a political non-starter for the hardliners
of the Conservative Party who will not want to compromise on such red lines as money, ECJ involvement or free
movement of people. In the eyes of many Brexiteers, any such compromise implies a loss of sovereignty and control.
STATE OF PLAY
From Bruges to Florence?
It is in this context that Prime Minister Theresa May, weakened by the general election result that did not produce a
majority for her and her Brexit approach, will hold a major speech on Brexit on 22 September in Florence. It will be
followed by the Conservative Party Conference from 1 to 4 October, a forum that tends to demand strident 'Britain
First' rhetoric from the party leader, alongside a clear commitment to keep the party together.
So, what might the Prime Minister say? She might be tempted to play both sides: a softer approach in her initial
speech and a harder tone at the Party Conference. This is a political gamble that could leave all sides dissatisfied.
Some have speculated that she might announce an official withdrawal from the European Economic Area (EEA). But
it is unlikely to satisfy proponents of either a hard or a soft Brexit, being too weak for one side and too deterministic
about the future for the other. Yet she can hardly claim progress in the EU withdrawal negotiations. Such a statement
would be immediately rebuked by the EU27. If she signals that a transition is in the cards, it would expose her to the
risk of a revolt from her Eurosceptic party members.
She could, of course, continue to reiterate some of the government's 'having-your-cake-and-eating-it-too' approach,
signalling a hard Brexit – outside the Single Market and the Customs Union with strong migration controls – and no
compromise on the withdrawal conditions, including a rejection of the EU's sequencing approach, while at the same
time professing that there will be a transition agreement, that the Northern Ireland border will remain open and that
the UK will continue to benefit from access to the Single Market.
From cake politics to a soft landing?
Satisfying the proponents of a soft Brexit will be tricky for her but they have become stronger, gaining ground after
Theresa May failed to get an endorsement for her Brexit stance from the electorate in the general election, which she
herself had called. Increasingly, there have been voices demanding an exit from Brexit. The election results even
triggered hopes among some that the Brexit decision could be reversed if the fragile government fell. Yet, a large
majority within both Conservative and Labour parties still believe that the result of the referendum must be
honoured. As a result, she is very unlikely to reverse the decision to leave but could declare that she has heard the
voices of business and soft Brexit proponents, and acknowledge that a transition post-Brexit and a softening on the
red lines is necessary.
This would be in line with the temporary shift in the public debate after the general election. The most strident
ideology-driven Brexiteers received less airtime. At the same time, the more pragmatic (or opportunistic) Conservatives
had become notably softer, arguing that a transition, a financial payment to the EU, the sequencing, and a role for the
ECJ are all potentially acceptable.
But this would not go down well at the party conference and for a weak Prime Minister it might mean losing her job.
Soft Brexit implies accepting unpalatable withdrawal conditions: a financial payment set by the EU, second class
membership for the transition period (all the obligations, no voting rights), no independent UK trade deals, continued
influence of EU law on the UK, as well as continued budgetary obligations and free movement of people. For many
Conservatives, this negates the whole purpose of Brexit, so they are unlikely to accept such a radical shift in position.
The only way this could potentially be sold is by demonstrating that the EU27 are willing to compromise on their red
lines too. Arguably, this could have been the reason behind the recent change in negotiating tactics, with the UK
starting to produce its own position papers on a range of issues, signalling room for compromise on some, if not all
issues, but demanding EU27 concessions as well, for example on sequencing. The hope might have been that the EU
would match this new approach, thus defusing some of the most difficult dossiers in the negotiation, by accepting,
for example, a reduced financial obligation of the UK, linking it directly to trade arrangements.
But the EU did not budge. Not only because of the direct interests concerned (money and own citizens) but also
because the negotiation process was not up for debate, having been set by the EU27 and previously accepted by
the UK. In addition, the papers simply did not go far enough in the direction of the EU27 position, leading to the
effective rejection of the UK positions and approach by the EU27, as well as a re-emphasis on the withdrawal
conditions and the unity of the 27.
This leaves the Prime Minister in an unenviable position. There is no majority in parliament for any type of Brexit, soft
or hard. But an exit from Brexit is also unlikely and would lead to the Conservatives losing power and, most likely,
the party splitting up. The Prime Minister can continue to try to muddle through but time will run out. And without
significant progress in the negotiations, can she hold on to power as costs mount?
PROSPECTS
Back to the cliff edge
Because of the current impasse and the rejection of the UK approach by the EU27, another change of stance is
emerging in the UK. Government ministers have apparently reneged on previously accepted positions, for example
on budgetary obligations. Boris Johnson has re-affirmed his leadership ambitions by emphasising hard line Brexit
positions. Direct attacks on the Commission, especially Michel Barnier and Commission President Jean-Claude
Juncker, have increased and are mirrored in the Eurosceptic press. Even though no member state would ever accept
it, British pundits now claim that it would be best to cut out the Commission from the negotiations, stating that
Germany and even France would be willing to cut a deal, behind the back of their negotiator. The negotiations have
effectively ground to a halt, with no prospect of substantive progress in October, as was previously hoped. The
rhetoric of 'no deal' has re-emerged prominently and many claim that falling back to WTO rules might be preferable
to accepting the EU's "dictate".
This is patently untrue. No deal would maximise economic harm, and would result in a complete and chaotic
collapse of economic and political relations with the EU, without enabling the UK to compensate for this
internationally. Its standing as a trustworthy partner would be irreversibly damaged. However, politically, a no deal
scenario seems to be an attractive option from the perspective of many in the Conservative Party. It means rejecting
the unpalatable EU conditions, looking strong and delivering a full Brexit. Blame would be shifted to the intransigent
Europeans. At present, they claim that a strong stance will force the Europeans to concede in the end, with Germany
backing a deal to save its car industry, despite contrary statements from the German government and German
industry. A breakdown in the negotiations satisfies the Brexiteers in the party, while Remainers probably have to
accept such a fait accompli, and it might safeguard Theresa May's job for a period of time. Despite Labour and the
rest of the opposition claiming that the Conservative Party's approach has failed, there is little they can do unless the
government loses its majority.
So, the Prime Minister might be tempted to go into the Florence speech and her party conference guns blazing, stating
that the UK will not accept the EU27's conditions and process, possibly disguised as a compromise offer which could
never be accepted by the EU27. Florence might have been chosen as President Juncker gave an uncompromising
speech there in the run-up to the general election. In any case, it would not be the first time that a Conservative Party
leader chooses to go to a European location to deliver a 'no compromise' speech – Margaret Thatcher's Bruges speech
is still legendary, especially in the Conservative Party. She might even go as far as suspending the talks until those
intransigent European bureaucrats realise that full trade negotiations without pre-conditions are in their own interest.
Any negative impact of such a step would be blamed on the EU. The Prime Minister would invoke a wartime spirit of
national unity, urging Britons to come together and withstand this attack on British sovereignty.
This can backfire. If those parts of her party that tend towards a soft Brexit are willing to vote with the opposition, it
could bring down the government. This could lead to a complete reversal in the UK's approach to the Brexit
negotiations if there is a change towards a government committed to a soft Brexit or even a reversal of Brexit. But this
is a high hurdle, as it would rely on rebels within the Conservative Party who would need to force a new general
election, which they themselves would be likely to lose.
Temporary reversal or permanent breakdown?
The suspension of talks would be a significant setback to achieve a deal before the end of the negotiation period.
At the very least, it would cost further time in a process that is already critically short and thus increase the chance
that the UK simply ends up with no deal at all. Even if there were a significant change in the UK's Brexit
approach, the UK would still struggle to show the rest of the EU that it was now a convinced European, able to
make sustainable commitments.
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The whole Brexit process has already led to a breakdown of trust, including a realisation that the UK's doctrine of
Westminster supremacy implies that any deal or accepted obligation might well be reversed by a future
parliamentary majority. This could lead to an extensive use of guillotine clauses, whereby if one condition is not
fulfilled, all other arrangements are immediately null and void. But this makes it difficult for the UK because it
implies a role for the Commission and ECJ, which would need to receive an oversight function to determine when
the UK would be in breach of its commitments.
Forward defence
No deal starts to look increasingly likely. Even if Theresa May does not suspend talks now, the dilemma she is facing
will persist. There is still hope that the UK's stance will change, which should not be abandoned, but this does not
imply that the approach of the EU27 needs fundamental adjustments. Only if the UK sees what the cliff edge
implies, may the EU27 witness a reasonable reorientation of the UK.
But, given that a no deal scenario imposes a huge cost not only on the UK but also on the rest of the EU, albeit
relatively less significant, the EU27 must do what it can to minimise harm. It is, however, far from clear how the EU
can prevent this from happening. What the EU should not do is attempt to deflect this scenario by making significant
concessions. Not only would the long-term cost, in terms of the Union's cohesion, be unacceptable, it would not
work: any concession would lead to demands of further concessions to keep UK voters happy.
But there are three steps the EU could take to facilitate the negotiations, pre-empt the blame game and prepare for
the worst. 
First, to ease the negotiations, the EU should break with the principle that the UK must come up with the solutions as
it has created the problem. The UK, because of its internal divisions, is no longer able to come up with coherent
positions. The EU should help the UK by fully defining the different scenarios and options: the content of a withdrawal
agreement, the nature of a transition period, the options for the final relationship – a trade deal vs. staying in the Single
Market and Customs Union. Essentially, the EU27 should set out how off-the-shelf solutions like the EEA could be
adapted to the UK. With these details on the table, it should become clearer for the UK what the trade-offs are and it
would ensure that the options, if approved by the UK, are implementable. The EU has little to lose as it holds the
stronger cards in the negotiations and there can be no suggestion of the EU giving up on its basic principles.
Second, at the same time, the EU should protect itself from the blame game. The most effective way is to make a
grand gesture: to unilaterally guarantee the rights of UK citizens currently residing in the EU. This would show that
the European Union is not willing to put political interests over the well-being of citizens, not using them as pawns
in the negotiating game. It would be a clever tactical move, but even more importantly, it would demonstrate that
the EU is defined by its principles and not driven by beggar-thy-neighbour considerations.
Finally, the EU must prepare for the worst-case scenario. No deal is economically nonsensical but politically
possible, maybe even likely for some. There must be contingency planning to minimise the impact on the EU27 if
the UK chooses to throw itself over the cliff edge. It is better to be prepared for an eventuality that does not happen
than to end up unprepared and be dragged down by the UK. This would entail looking at how to deal with assets
and liabilities, what legal mechanisms in private, European and international law would be available and how the
EU would diplomatically engage with third countries and international organisations.
For domestic reasons in the UK, the no deal scenario will remain on the table. It may not come to that: the
economic costs are enormous and there are numerous negative political implications, including a potential split-up
of the UK. But it would not be the first time that a country that has run into a domestic impasse has used
international conflict to deflect from shortcomings at home.
Fabian Zuleeg is Chief Executive and Chief Economist at the European Policy Centre (EPC).
The views expressed in this Policy Brief are the sole responsibility of the author.
